THE ALLEY BEHIND FIRST STREET, NORTHEAST
Criminal Abortion in the Nation’s Capital, 1872-1973
Douglas R. Miller1
Thirty-two years ago, the United States Supreme Court struck down
the conception-to-birth prohibitions on abortion that had operated for at
least a century in almost every state.2 As women learned they needed no
longer choose between involuntary parenthood and the secretive, often
fatal underworld of criminal abortion, the impact of the ruling resonated
across the nation. But the practices Roe ended that day in 1973 were by
no means remote. The streets and back alleys in the shadow of One First
Street, N.E. had witnessed a rich history of illegal abortion for decades
before the Court’s stately edifice was erected on that site. Since the
comprehensive prohibition statute of 1872, Washington D.C. had been
home to the nameless practitioners, clandestine contacts, bribery, raids,
arrests, and prosecutions that typified the illegal practice of abortion in
America.
To explore the District of Columbia’s experience of criminal abortion,
this article undertakes a historical survey of the state and the development
of law before prohibition, the enactment, evolution and justification of
prohibition, and the records left by those who fell foul of the law. Part I of
this article examines the history of abortion regulation from theological,
philosophical, and political perspectives. Beginning with Greek and
Hebrew approaches to fetal development and tortious miscarriage, Part IA
proceeds through early Christian and medieval reasoning to arrive at the
“quickening” distinction in the Common Law, which designated the first
fetal movement as the moment of ensoulment and thus of full legal
protection. Part IB then examines the nineteenth-century physicians’
campaign that engendered the District’s 1872 statute. This section
inquires into the self-interested motivations of the American Medical
Association in restricting abortion to its members’ control, together with
the dubious physiological and social arguments the campaign brought to
bear in support of its cause. Part II then examines the various proposed
and enacted District of Columbia statutes that grew out of the nineteenth1
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century anti-abortion movement. Part III of this article constructs an
anecdotal history of criminal abortion experiences based on published
opinions of District of Columbia courts. This history yields narratives of
desperate women’s tragic deaths, their legal disabilities and ordeals in the
courts, targeting of physicians by the government, bribery of witnesses
and police by the accused, and defenses ranging from the obvious to the
bizarre. The survey of cases culminates with United States v. Vuitch,3 the
test case that, for a brief period, left D.C. the most liberal abortion
jurisdiction in the United States, and galvanized the nationwide legal
challenge to abortion prohibitions.
The history of criminal abortion is no mere academic curiosity. The
debate over abortion regulation continues to divide America, and the
future of unrestricted abortion remains in doubt. Both sides of the debate
are myopic in their rhetoric: abortion rights supporters advocate personal
autonomy without reference to fetal protection; abortion opponents
champion fetuses while dismissing women’s interests in selfdetermination. In order to effectively rule and legislate on abortion, jurists
and politicians must understand the complex philosophical history that
underlies the moral and political debate. More importantly, they must
understand the social history of criminal abortion, to understand the
inevitable consequences of prohibition. This article’s choice of focus was
motivated by the belief that a social history unfolding in the very
neighborhoods where national leaders live and work will prove especially
compelling.
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO
ABORTION REGULATION
Within the span of seventy-two years, District of Columbia law
progressed from a complete absence of codified abortion regulations to a
near-total ban on the practice. In order to understand the pre-statute legal
status of abortion and the rapid move to prohibition, this section begins
from first principles and traces the philosophical and political history of
abortion from classical antiquity into the nineteenth century.
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A. The Common Law View of Abortion
The essential conflict in the modern debate over abortion is between
women’s personal autonomy and privacy interests and the putative fetal
interest in avoiding injury and death. But given the subordinate status
women held in most cultures from at least the agricultural revolution into
the twentieth century, the historical abortion debate was not conducted in
those terms. Female autonomy was hardly a concern of natural and
religious philosophers; the propriety of abortion would depend solely on
fetal status. Nonetheless, what the law does not proscribe it tacitly allows,
and so any restriction of abortion based on fetal personhood necessarily
required some rational justification if it were to legitimately abridge a
previously unrestricted practice. One necessary element of this rational
foundation must be a determination as to the gestational moment at which
the proposed fetal protection attaches. Logically, there are three temporal
options from which to choose. The fetus may acquire protected status at
the moment of conception, at the moment of birth, or at some intermediate
moment. The ultimate solution of the Common Law – an intermediate
gestational point known as “quickening” – resulted from centuries of
evolution and synthesis among natural, legal, and religious philosophy.
1. The biblical origins of mid-gestational legal protection
The fountainhead of Western theological reasoning on fetal status is
the tortious miscarriage provision of 21 Exodus 22-25:
And if two men are fighting and one should strike a pregnant
woman so that her fruits come forth, but there is no harm, then he
shall certainly be fined as the woman’s husband imposes on him,
and he shall pay as the judges assess. But if harm should occur,
then you must give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand
for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for
bruise.4
4
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The precise meaning of this passage is obscure. Under one
interpretation, it means that tortious miscarriage is punishable by fine
only, but harm to the adult woman is punishable according to the lex
talionis.5 Under this reading, the fetus enjoys a lesser legal protection than
the mother, or possibly no protection at all (since the fine paid to the father
may be seen as compensation for the loss of an heir, rather than a penalty
to punish commission of a wrong). Thus, this reading places the point of
legal protection at birth.
However, an alternative interpretation holds that, because the word
( -son, “harm”) takes no indirect object in the text, and because the
tortious wounding or killing of an adult is proscribed elsewhere in the
Pentateuch6 – thus obviating the need for a special provision protecting
pregnant women independent of their fetuses – lex talionis does apply to
fetal harm.7 Indeed, because the passage can be read as referring to
premature birth as well as miscarriage, the law may contemplate
intermediate punishments for non-fatal harm to the fetus; should the child
be born disfigured or disabled, the appropriate lex talionis corporeal or
monetary sanction would be imposed on the tortfeasor.8 Under this
viewpoint, the fetus does enjoy equal protection with the mother, since the
same scale of penalties applies to those who harm either. Furthermore, no
intermediate gestational date must be achieved by the fetus to obtain the
law’s protection under this reading; at least in theory (notwithstanding
obvious evidentiary problems) the fully-protected status would attach at
conception.
Whichever of these interpretations is “correct,” it is clear that by the
third century B.C., the Alexandrian Jewish community had adopted the
former.9 The Septuagint (the Alexandrian Jews’ translation of the Hebrew
bible into the Greek vernacular), renders the “
” rule as turning not on
whether “harm” or “no harm” is present, but rather on whether or not the
used the literal “fruits” rather than “children,” and the literal “come forth” rather than
“are born,” “abort,” or “miscarry.” I have also refrained from interpolating “further”
before “harm,” as some modern versions do, because it is not supported by the literal
text and prejudices the solution to the ambiguity addressed in this discussion.
5
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child is born
µ
(exeikonismenon, “fully formed”).10 In other
words, if tortious injury to a pregnant woman caused the miscarriage of a
fetus not fully formed, then a fine would apply, but if a fully formed fetus
were stillborn, the tortfeasor was liable according to the lex talionis. Thus,
by at least the third century B.C., 21 Exodus 22-25 had come to signify a
mid-gestational point for the attachment of fetal protection under the law.
2. Development of the quickening concept from the midgestational onset of legal protection
The Septuagint became the basis for early Christian Latin versions of
the Pentateuch, and thus the Alexandrian interpretation of fetal
personhood as attaching mid-gestation became the accepted view within
the early Christian church.11 But the exact point at which protection
attached was not defined; the distinction between tortious miscarriage and
capital feticide was determined only post hoc, based on the evidentiary
standard of
µ
. In forming a more precise rule of fetal law,
the early church turned its attentions to ideas developed a century before
the Septuagint’s translation: the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his
contemporaries at the Lyceum.12
Aristotle reasoned that gestation encompassed three stages, during
which the fetus possessed three distinct “souls,” the
(psyche
threptike, “nutritive soul,”) the
, (psyche aisthitike,
“sensitive soul,”) and the
(psyche dianoitike, “rational
13
soul”). Before infusion with the rational soul, the fetus was not human,
but rather an undifferentiated animal; sentient, but without reason.14
Indeed, the classical Greek worldview, linked as it was to that society’s
mythological tradition, did not exclude the notion that a human might give
birth to a lesser animal or indeed a monster.15
Aristotle’s natural philosophy thus presented the early church with a
more concrete basis for the mid-gestational commencement of human
status and legal entitlement. The Christian Neoplatonists developed
10
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Aristotle’s concept of
, and particularly
, into the
Christian notion of anima, or immortal soul. This animais the rational
and uniquely human essence believed to inhabit and survive the human
body, ultimately to be reunited with it through resurrection conditioned on
salvation.16 St. Augustine subsequently applied the Christian concept of
anima to 21 Exodus 22-25, distinguishing the soulless – and thus
unprotected – fetus (embryo inanimatus)17 from the legally protected,
ensouled embryo (embryo animatus).18
It was St. Augustine’s Neoplatonic understanding of gestation and
ensoulment which formed the basis for St. Thomas Aquinas’s
interpolation of mid-gestational fetal protection into the Canon Law some
eight centuries later.19 “One would be guilty of homicide,” Augustine
announced, “if the death either of the mother or the ensouled fetus were to
result from a blow to a pregnant woman.”20
In medieval England, the word cwike (cwuca in Old English, later
quycke, quicke, and eventually quick) had come to mean both “alive” and
“moving.”21 The conflation of these dual meanings, as applied to
Neoplatonist Christian dogma, resulted in a rather novel solution to the
fetal status problem: the fetus’s first kick was believed to signify the
arrival of the rational soul.22 This result was justified by either of two
explanations. Under the first, a kick was a “sensible” motion, and thus
only achievable once the work of the sensitive soul was finished (i.e. the
moment at which the rational soul was ready to take over.) Under the
second, a kick was a “voluntary” motion, and thus impossible until the
rational soul had taken hold.23 The English religious understanding of
ensoulment at quickening therefore provided a precise moment at which
the Canon Law distinction between pre-ensoulment fetal death and postensoulment homicide could be drawn.
The Common Law’s adoption of the Canon Law distinction did not
occur immediately. According to Henri de Bracton’s understanding of the
16
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Common Law around A.D. 1230, “If one strikes a pregnant woman or
gives her poison in order to procure an abortion, if the fetus is already
formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened, he commits
homicide.”24 This formulation does not comport precisely with the Canon
Law view. To Bracton, the abortion of any puerperium formatum
(“formed fetus”) was homicide; the abortion of a puerperium animatum
(“quickened fetus”), was more egregious, but it was not the sole act
punishable as abortion.25 Thus Bracton seems to have believed that legal
protection attached to the fetus at some point earlier in pregnancy.
Half a century later, however, Fleta (the anonymous author of the
primary thirteenth-century commentary on Bracton, perhaps an inmate of
London’s Fleet prison), restated Bracton’s rule with the following
alteration: “if the fetus is already formed and quickened . . . .”26 By
replacing vel with et, Fleta harmonized the Common Law view with the
contemporary Canon Law: that legal protection attached to the fetus only
at the moment of quickening.27
The recognition of quickening as the point of ensoulment and legal
protection seems to have continued through the Common Law’s history.
In 1680, Edward Coke stated the law of abortion and tortious miscarriage
thus:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe; this is a great
misprision, and no murder: but if the childe be born alive, and
dieth of the potion, battery or other cause, this is murder . . . . And
so horrible an offence should not go unpunished. And so was the
law holden in Bracton’s time . . . [a]nd herewith agreeth Fleta . . .
.28
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Coke thus imposes an additional (perhaps evidentiary) standard of live
birth to draw the line between misdemeanor feticide and murder. But the
requirement of quickening for any legal protection remains constant.
Blackstone apparently adopted Coke’s view in compiling his
Commentaries sixty years later: “To kill a child in it's [sic] mother's
womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the child be born
alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb,
it is murder in such as administered or gave them.”29
Because Blackstone and Coke became the most important secondary
sources of Common Law in the eighteenth-century American colonies, it
is reasonable to assume that the earliest United States jurists shared
Blackstone’s and Coke’s understanding of abortion. At the time of
American independence, the state of the law therefore appears to have
been as follows: pre-quickening abortion was not illegal, post-quickening
abortion was misdemeanor feticide, and post-quickening abortion that
resulted in the birth of a live child which subsequently died of its injuries
was murder.
Hence, some fifteen years after American independence, the new
District of Columbia became heir to a Common Law abortion framework
which represented the synthesis of over two millennia’s Jewish, Greek,
Christian, and English moral, natural, and legal reasoning.
B. The Nineteenth-Century American Campaign for Birth-toConception Prohibition
Abortion remained subject to Common Law regulation in England and
the United States until 1803. In that year, the British parliament passed
Lord Ellenborough’s Act,30 making post-quickening abortion a capital
offense. Pre-quickening abortion was deemed a non-capital felony,
rendering the convict “liable to be fined, imprisoned, set in and upon the
Pillory, publickly or privately whipped . . . or to be transported beyond the
Seas for any Term not exceeding Fourteen Years.”31
American legislatures did not take up abortion until two decades later,
and when they did, the new laws resembled poison control measures more
than attempts to curb abortion per se.32 Crucially, they did not abolish the
29
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quickening distinction, and they did not prohibit abortion so much as the
commercial sale of patent abortifacients.33 The highly restrictive laws
which, until 1973, criminalized most abortions from conception onward,
emerged as the result of a concerted effort begun in 1857 by the newlyformed American Medical Association.34 At the campaign’s head was Dr.
Horatio Robinson Storer (1830-1922), a Boston gynecologist and surgeon.
The success of this campaign was such that, within a quarter century of its
inception, nearly every jurisdiction (including the District of Columbia)
had enacted a statute criminalizing abortion from conception onward.35
It may surprise the modern reader to learn that physicians, the most
common abortion defendants in the twentieth century, and among the
foremost proponents of its decriminalization (viz. the familiar refrain “a
choice between a woman and her doctor”), had engaged in a virulent
campaign to outlaw the practice scarcely a century earlier. In fact, this
campaign arose out of questionably self-interested motives, presented a
somewhat fanciful view of “scientific” embryology, and relied on rather
predictable appeals to gendered and ethnic animus.
1. Motivations behind the campaign
While the medical campaign against abortion doubtless reflected the
legitimate moral and social beliefs of its participants, another, more
practical motivation is apparent. The formation of the AMA represented a
concerted effort on the part of rigorously trained graduates of elite
allopathic medical schools to restrict the medical franchise to
themselves.36 Prior to this time, “regulars” as these physicians were
known, faced virtually unrestrained competition from homeopaths, faith
healers, midwives, and self- or apprenticeship-trained practitioners.
Collectively, these latter groups were known as “irregulars.”37
Competition was particularly fierce in the arena of reproductive
medicine, to which “scientific” obstetrics and gynecology were fledgling
33
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latecomers.38 Most women employed midwives for their obstetrical
needs, and in some cases those needs extended to abortion.39
Obstetrician/gynecologists sought to demarginalize themselves within the
medical profession, where even the most learned among them were
referred to as “professors of midwifery.”40 Indeed, their moral status in
the community at large was often suspect, since these were men who made
a profession of examining female genitalia at a time when Victorian mores
banned even husbands from visual and manual contact with those
organs.41
Despite reservations that they might have had about their colleagues’
choice of specialty, regular physicians as a whole united with the ob/gyns
in their attempts to wrest control of reproductive medicine from irregulars.
This struggle was central to the AMA’s interests, and not only because it
concerned a significant area of competition. Driving midwives out of
business was additionally beneficial for all physicians, because nearly
every family was likely to need reproductive medical services at some
point. Families who regularly employed the neighborhood midwife, the
“regulars” feared, might from habit or familiarity turn to her as the first
source of treatment for any ailment. By controlling reproductive
medicine, the AMA hoped to control the “gateway” to medicine as a
whole.42 Thus, for reasons that may have served business as much as
morals or public health, the medical anti-abortion movement brought to
bear a number of arguments grounded in contemporary scientific and
social beliefs.
2. The physiological argument
The Canon Law and Common Law views of abortion reflected both
women’s understandings of their bodily functions43 and Judeo-GrecoChristian religious understanding of natural philosophy. The popular view
of gestation comported with the maternal experience of detecting a
separate, involuntary movement within the womb at a point approximately
halfway through pregnancy. This moment, at which the experience of
38
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pregnancy transformed from mere physiological changes in the self to the
direct experience of another, independent actor within the body, marked a
logical point at which to draw the distinction between mother/child as a
single entity and mother and child as distinct entities.
Indeed, many women in a pre-scientific age may not have recognized
early gestation as pregnancy at all, but rather as a period of “blocked
menses,” which was sometimes, but by no means always, a precursor to
quickening and true pregnancy.44 The perceptional disconnect between
cessation of menstruation and the onset of pregnancy is perhaps
explainable by the frequency of spontaneous early miscarriage, and the
prevalence of true (i.e. non-gestational) amenorrhea as a symptom of
illness or malnutrition. Thus, when some women took home-preparations
– and later patent medicines – made up of pennyroyal, tansy, ergot,
snakeroot, cotton root, or savin (juniper extract), it is possible that they did
not conceptualize them as abortifacients terminating pregnancies, but
rather remedies that would “bring on the menses,” i.e. cure their
amenorrhea.45
As discussed in section IA, legal and religious understandings of
abortion were premised on metaphysical notions of rational ensoulment,
but dovetailed with popular understandings of the body in that they
adopted quickening as the moment of delineation.
Not surprisingly, organized medicine, which saw itself as a scientific
movement at odds with folk or religious natural philosophy, set about
attacking these traditional understandings of gestation.46 The medical
movement dismissed quickening as of no scientific significance,47 and
ensoulment theory as “metaphysical speculation.”48 It sought instead to
introduce contemporary embryology as the model by which fetal rights
should be determined.
Autonomous life, the movement argued, began at conception, because
at that point the embryo possessed an independent capacity for growth.49
The fact that a fetus was generally not viable before seven months did not
matter to Dr. James Whitmire, who proclaimed that “[t]he truly
44
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professional man's morals . . . are not of that easy caste, because he sees in
the germ the probable embryo, in the embryo the rudimentary fœtus, and
in that, the seven months viable child and the prospective living, moving,
breathing man or woman . . . .”50 Furthermore, because the embryo was
attached to the mother only by the umbilicus, and then only via the
placenta, the movement argued that the embryo was in a scientific sense
an independent being.51
This notion of physical and moral disconnect from the mother was
crucial to the movement’s proffered explanation of gestation. Storer
announced that an unfertilized egg “may perhaps be considered as a part
and parcel” of a woman before conception, “but not afterwards.”52 He
compared the embryo to a nursing infant, asserting that
[t]his is no fanciful analogy; its truth is proved by countless facts.
In the kangaroo, for instance, the offspring is born into the world at
an extremely early stage of development . . . and then is placed by
the mother in an external, abdominal, or marsupial pouch, to
portions of which corresponding, so far as function goes, at once to
teats and to the uterine sinuses, these embryos cling by an almost
vascular connection, until they are sufficiently advanced to bear
detachment, or in reality to be born. . . . The first impregnation of
the egg, whether in man or in kangaroo, is the birth of the offspring
to life; its emergence into the outside world for wholly separate
existence is, for one as for the other, but an accident in time.53
The physiological picture of gestation presented by the medical antiabortion movement, then, was a systematic attempt to discredit the popular
and religious understanding of the fetus as one with its mother throughout
pregnancy, and not uniquely human until the moment of quickening.
Instead, the movement sought to substitute a view of a protected,
miniature (usually male) adult, who, though he appears at first as “the
invisible product of conception,” inevitably “develop[s], grows, passes
through the embryonic and fœtal stages of existence, appears as the
50

James S. Whitmire, Criminal Abortion, 31 CHI. MED. J. 385, 392 (1874), quoted in
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HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 17 (Boston,
Lee & Shepard 1866), quoted in Siegel,supra note 35, at 289.
53
STORER, supra note 52, at 29-30, quoted in Siegel,supra note 35, at 289-90.
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breathing and lovely infant, the active, the intelligent boy, the studious
moral youth, the adult man, rejoicing in the plenitude of his corporeal
strength and intellectual powers, capable of moral and spiritual
enjoyments . . . .”54
In an age that came to worship science almost as a new religion, the
practitioners of a scientific profession were at a distinct advantage in
winning the public over to their cause. If its arguments bent the finer
points of biological understanding to a rhetorical purpose, the physicians’
movement doubtless felt this small mendacity justified. Removing
irregulars from the practice of reproductive medicine, they likely
reasoned, was to everyone’s benefit, because it meant the general
substitution of scientific healing for folk medicine. But Victorian America
had other preoccupations, and it was to these that the anti-abortion
movement next appealed.
3. The social order argument
Abortion, its medical critics urged, threatened to undermine the social
order because it distracted women from their physiologically-determined
roles of wives and mothers, and made them easier prey for the misguided
proponents of feminism. Women selfishly sought abortions, it was
argued, “to avoid the labor and the expense of rearing children, and the
interference with pleasurable pursuits, fashions, and frivolities,”55 and by
doing so chose “an indolent, selfish life, neglecting the work God ha[d]
appointed [them] to perform."56
The physicians’ anti-abortion movement was openly hostile to the
feminist movement, which it saw as promoting female abandonment of
maternal duty:
"Woman's rights" now are understood to be, that she should be a
man, and that her physical organism, which is constituted by
Nature to bear and rear offspring, should be left in abeyance, and
54
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ANDREW NEBINGER, CRIMINAL ABORTION; ITS EXTENT AND PREVENTION 11
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that her ministrations in the formation of character as mother
should be abandoned for the sterner rights of voting and law
making.57

Indeed, the notions of reproductive choice and electoral choice were
conflated by members of the movement, who warned that women sought
not only to vote for political leaders, but also to “elect” how many children
they would have.58 Although the nineteenth-century feminist movement
was almost monolithic in its opposition to abortion, which it viewed as an
evil forced upon women by lustful husbands and deceitful suitors,59 the
anti-abortion movement nonetheless blamed feminists for tacitly
encouraging abortion through engendering an illicit desire to shirk female
responsibilities.60
The rhetorical genius of the anti-abortion movement’s attack on
feminism was its success in turning feminist arguments about marriage
and sexual morality precisely on their heads. Nineteenth-century
feminism advocated “voluntary motherhood,” which essentially meant
female control of marital sexuality.61 The classical legal understanding of
marriage bestowed on the husband rights in his wife’s labor and sexuality,
in exchange for his duty of support.62 The feminist movement saw this
arrangement as little better than chattel slavery and legalized
prostitution.63 Further, it argued, the approach to sexuality which society
imposed on females – chastity until marriage, monogamy afterwards –
was morally superior to the standard it tacitly approved for males –
lifelong patronization of (actual) prostitutes and marital infidelity.64
The anti-abortion movement reversed this rhetoric, lobbing it back at
its source with Storer’s charge that women who aborted (and thus,
presumably, many feminists) committed a sin of precisely equal gravity as
men who visited prostitutes.65 Indeed, abortion further threatened female
morality, it was argued, because it threatened female chastity and thus
57
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every family’s interests in descent.66 While the medical anti-abortion
movement was directed primarily at married women, the charge that
abortion permitted unmarried women to have sex was also of importance.
With the availability of abortion, female chastity could not so easily “be
enforced with severe social and legal sanctions, among which fear of
pregnancy function[s] effectively and naturally.”67
The medical anti-abortion movement further appropriated the
“legalized prostitution” metaphor, arguing that it was marriage without
child bearing, rather than “ordinary” marriage, which gave rise to this
condition.68 The physicians argued that “so long as man’s sexual urge
were allowed expression in marriage without reproductive consequence . .
. the very aspiration to avoid maternity [was] an expression of unnatural
egoism or immoral license,” i.e. legalized prostitution.69 Indeed, at least
one physician implied that not only might feminism cause the evil of
abortion, abortion might cause the evil of feminism. William Goodell
argued that women engaging in contraception or abortion turned to
feminism because
[t]he sexual instinct has been given to man for the perpetuation of
the species. . . . Dissociate one from the other, and . . . wedlock
lapses into licentiousness; the wife is degraded into a mistress . . .
[she] takes distorted views of life and of the marriage relation, and
harbors resentment against her husband as the author of all her
ills.70
The elite physicians who led the anti-abortion campaign of the
nineteenth-century were predominantly American-born men of English
and German lineage.71 Given the social concerns of the time, it was
natural that their arguments should also play on “native” fear of immigrant
elements. Fertility among the native-born, Protestant classes had declined
relative to that of immigrants by 1850, and some attributed this disparity
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to the disproportionate practice of abortion among native-born women.72
One year after the surrender at Appomattox, Storer asked his readers
whether “the fertile savannas of the South, now disenthralled and first
made habitable by freemen … [would be] filled by our own children or by
those of aliens?”73 At the same time as “gaps in our population … have
late been made by disease and the sword … the great territories of the far
West … offer homes for countless millions yet unborn,” he mused, and
charged that the ethnic makeup of those future Americans was “a question
that our own women must answer; upon their loins depends the future
destiny of the nation.”74
This fear of ethnic outnumbering was widespread among the antiabortionists. Augustus Gardner dedicated his tract “[t]o the Reverend
Clergy of the United States who by example and instruction have the
power to arrest the rapid extinction of the Native American People."75
And it was explicitly political, as attested to by Dr. H.S. Pomeroy’s
observation that “our voters – and so our lawmakers and rulers, indirectly,
if not directly – come more and more from the lowest class, because that
class is able and willing to have children, while the so-called better classes
seem not to be.”76
Thus, the anti-abortion movement successfully exploited Victorian
concerns about the effect of sexual and reproductive control on women’s
propensity to violate social norms and shirk prescribed maternal duties. It
effectively appropriated the rhetoric of the nineteenth-century feminist
movement, forcing its idiom through the looking glass of moral blame,
and accusing (hardly pro-abortion) feminists of the very licentiousness
they attributed to men. But as the movement attacked the women of its
members’ own social and ethnic class for their behavior, it likewise sought
to persuade them that all class members should unite against the common
enemy of immigrant domination.
The District of Columbia had inherited a Common Law abortion view
drawn on centuries of personal, religious, and philosophical understanding
of pregnancy and the body. Yet just seven decades after its creation, the
72
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District bowed to a self-interested pressure group’s quasi-scientific, antifeminist, and anti-immigrant campaign to ban abortion. During a brief
period of home rule, the District’s legislature passed a prohibition that
would drive its women and its abortion providers underground for 101
years.
II. ABORTION STATUTES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. The Law Prior To 1872
At the time of its creation in 1800, the District of Columbia was
subject to existing Maryland and Virginia statutes, and, if not superceded,
to pre-1776 English Common Law and statutes in force by 1776.77 The
Common Law understanding of abortion was apparently sufficient for the
District; no mention of abortion appears in the first compilation of D.C.
laws (the “Cranch Code”) or in the municipal ordinances of the City of
Washington.78
In 1855, an Act of Congress called for the creation of a code for the
District, to be approved by a popular vote of District residents.79 Chapter
130, §§ 15-17 of the code (compiled in 1857) would have provided D.C’s
first abortion statute. The language is somewhat akin to the Common Law
pre- versus post- “quickening” standard as articulated in section I of this
article, but potentially ambiguous:
Sec. 15. Any physician or other person who shall administer to
any woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, drug, or
substance whatever, or shall use any instrument or other means
77
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with intent to destroy such child, shall, in case of the death of such
child or mother in consequence thereof, be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.
Sec. 16. Any physician or person who shall willfully administer to
any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, or substance whatever,
or use any instrument or other means, with the intent thereby to
procure the miscarriage of such woman, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two nor
more than ten years.
Sec. 16. No person shall be published by reason of any act
mentioned in the two sections immediately preceding, where such
act is done in good faith, with the intention of saving the life of
such woman or child.80

Precisely what distinction the drafters sought to create between § 15
and § 16 is uncertain. Literally read, the sections criminalize both
attempted and successful pre-quickening abortion, but only successful
post-quickening abortion. This reading seems problematic because the
greater penalty for post-quickening abortion suggests that the drafters
believed it the more serious crime. It is therefore unlikely that they would
have excused its attempt, while criminalizing unsuccessful pre-quickening
abortions.
It is plausible that, taken together with § 15, “pregnant” in § 16 implies
quickening. Under this reading, pre-quickening abortion would be no
crime; post-quickening abortion would be criminal, and the penalties
would differ for completion and attempt. This ambiguity would doubtless
have proven fruit for vigorous judicial construction, but the proposed code
was never ratified, and abortion in D.C. would remain subject to the
Common Law for another fifteen years.81
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B. The 1872 Act
In 1872, the short-lived Legislative Assembly for the District of
Columbia passed a comprehensive abortion prohibition.82 Section One
provides that
[a]ny person who shall administer, or cause to be administered, to
any woman in any condition of pregnancy, any medication, drug,
substance, or thing whatsoever, with the intention thereby to
produce a miscarriage . . . or shall use on any such woman any
instruments, or any other means for said purposes, shall, in case of
the death of said woman . . . or in case of the death of the child
therefrom, be guilty of manslaughter, and be punished . . . by
imprisonment at hard labor . . . for a period of not less than four no
more than seven years, and be fined in a sum not exceeding one
thousand dollars.83 [Emphasis added.]
The differences between the 1857 and the 1872 statutes are significant.
First, the quickening distinction is abolished; the prohibition applies to
abortions “in any condition of pregnancy.” Second, the law explicitly
equates abortion with homicide, rendering the abortion provider guilty of
manslaughter, not the separate crime of abortion.
Section Two provides somewhat lesser penalties for aiders and
abettors, but defines these categories widely, to sweep in not only
procurers and assistants, but also anyone who chooses to “advise, direct,
or counsel” abortion, or even merely “countenance or approve” the
procedure. It is conceivable that attempted abortion might be prosecutable
under this section’s broad language.84
Section Three provides a life-of-the-mother exception, with an
additional requirement that at least one other physician concur in the
decision.85 Sections Four and Five prohibit the sale of abortifacients
except on the written prescription of a licensed “graduated” physician, and
82
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require that pharmacists keep a separate register of all such
dispensations.86 Section Six forbids the advertisement of abortifacients,
although cleverly avoids the appearance of prior restraint by providing a
five-day notice requirement before charges may be brought.87 Section
Seven requires the District Coroner to analyze all suspected abortifacients
and abortion instruments whenever there is suspicion of an abortion.88
Section Eight permits the testimony of co-conspirators to abortion against
one another, and provides both civil and criminal immunity to such
testimony.89
C. Section 22-201
In 1901, all previous D.C. statutes were superceded by the
congressional Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of
Columbia.90 The 1901 code pared the 1872 Act down to a single
paragraph:
Sec. 809. PROCURING MISCARRIAGE.—Whoever, with intent to
procure the miscarriage of any woman, prescribes or administers to
her any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or with like intent
uses any instrument or means, unless when necessary to preserve
her life or health and under the direction of a competent licensed
practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned for not more than five
years; or if the woman or her child dies in consequence of such act,
by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than twenty
years.91
The 1901 code thus adopts the 1872 statute’s from-conception
prohibition. It retains the life-of-the-mother exemption, and adds a health
exemption. It eliminates the complex regulation of pharmacists, although
presumably the unauthorized sale of abortifacients is proscribed by the
“administers . . . unless under the direction of” language. It reintroduces
86
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the statutory distinction between attempted and completed abortion, and it
imposes quite a severe maximum penalty on the latter: twenty years, as
opposed to only seven under the 1872 Act.
Section 802, recodified as § 22-201 in 1940,92 persisted in this form
until 1953. In that year, Congress passed the District of Columbia Law
Enforcement Act of 1953.93 As part of the Act, § 22-201 was amended to
read:
Whoever, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other
means whatever, procures or produces, or attempts to procure or
produce an abortion or miscarriage on any woman, unless the same
were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or
health and under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner
of medicine, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than
one year or not more than ten years; or if the death of the mother
results therefrom, the person . . . shall be guilty of second degree
murder.94 [Emphasis added.]
As indicated, this statute eliminates the distinction between attempted
and completed abortion, and thereby raises the maximum penalty for the
former, while lowering the maximum penalty for the latter. It also
dramatically increases the consequences of killing the patient. While
earlier laws had recognized patient death as essentially an aggravating
circumstance of abortion, the 1953 statute labels the hapless abortion
provider as murderer, regardless of his or her actual intent, and without
even a showing of recklessness in performing the operation. An earlier
version of the 1953 Act would have removed the health-of-the-mother
exception, but this provision was abandoned for reasons which are not
apparent from the legislative history.95
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Section 22-201, later recodified as § 22-101,96 remained in force as
amended until rendered unconstitutional in 1973 by Roe v. Wade.97
Curiously, it has never been repealed, and remains in the current D.C.
Code.98 While its survival might superficially suggest oversight, it is
notable that a typographical error within the text of the 1953 Act’s
abortion section was corrected by the D.C. Council in 1989, as part of a
technical amendments act that eliminated numerous other obsolete
sections.99 Three decades into its obsolescence, § 22-101 remains the first
offense enumerated in D.C.’s criminal code, a vestigial reminder of a
century’s criminal abortion.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF CRIMINAL ABORTION IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS REFLECTED IN THE REPORTED
CASES
Abortion is by its nature private, and countless thousands no doubt
took place without record during the District’s century of prohibition.
Where, however, the private act of abortion was forced into public view
by a criminal prosecution, judicial opinions provide a historical window
into this illegal practice. Appellate records are imperfect sources of
history for numerous reasons. Facts are subordinated to law, and only
those relevant to the issues on appeal need be reported. Appealed cases
are by no means representative of all cases brought – the stories of those
defendants who pled guilty, were acquitted, or lacked financial means to
appeal left no mark on the published case reports. But given these
limitations, the reported cases permit a rare glimpse into the social,
practical, and legal troubles faced by participants in the shadow world of
criminal abortion.
The D.C. reported cases100 concern twenty-one charged abortions or
attempts, although a number of cases refer to additional abortions as
96

D.C. Code, 1973 Ed. § 22-101.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98
D.C. Code, 2001 Ed. § 22-101.
99
Technical Amendments Act of 1988, preamble and § 28, 36 D.C. Reg. 492 (codified as
amended at D.C. Code Ann. § 22-101 (2001).
100
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971)[hereinafter Vuitch II]; Copes v. United
States, 345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Hunt v. United States, 301 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Bush v. United
States, 301 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d 155 (D.C.
Cir. 1960); Agee v. United States, 248 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McAllister v.
97

THE ALLEY BEHIND FIRST STREET, NORTHEAST

23

evidence of the charged abortion or other offenses. Of these twenty-one
abortions, seven allegedly resulted in the death of the patient. Of twentynine identifiable defendants, twenty-one were accused of performing
abortions themselves, and five of aiding and abetting as go-betweens,
assistants, or, in one case, the paramour of the patient. Three additional
defendants could be identified as to name, but not as to specific role in the
charged abortion. Twenty-one defendants were male; eight were female.
Of the twenty-one alleged principal abortion providers, eleven were
identified as medical doctors, seven were identified as non-physicians, and
three were not identifiable by qualification.
A. Abortion Narratives

United States, 239 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Brown v. United States, 239 F.2d 75
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Peckham II]; Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.1954) [hereinafter
Peckham I]; Spriggs v. United States, 205 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Goodloe v.
United States, 188 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Miller v. United States, 169 F.2d 967
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II]; Kemp v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 539 (D.C. Cir. 1914)[hereinafter Kemp I];
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Amid the legal analysis, the reported cases contain some compelling,
first hand accounts of illegal abortion as it was experienced by patients,
providers and police in the District of Columbia. It was apparently a
world fraught with dangers: arrest and imprisonment for the provider,
morbidity or death for the patient. But even if such risks did not manifest
themselves, surely the secrecy – the code names, the intermediaries, and
the anonymous offices – weighed heavily on all the parties, forced as they
were into this underworld by a legal regime that excoriated their conduct.
Sadie Volk was a domestic cook who found herself three months
pregnant in October of 1905. She later told a court that
she went to the house of the defendant . . . and was shown into his
office. She inquired of defendant, who was alone, if he operated.
He said "Yes," and that he would perform the operation. He then
inquired how long she had been pregnant, and her answer was
"three months." He caused her to recline on a sofa in the office,
lifted her clothes, and performed an operation on her. She could
not see what he did. He operated about ten minutes. She paid him
$15, and he told her if the operation did not have effect to return on
the third day thereafter.101
Three days later, a Dr. McKay (presumably a “regular” physician) was
summoned to Sadie’s house where he
found her in her room, in bed, covered with clothes and soaked
with blood. Found membrane projecting from her vagina which
meant that a child had recently been brought forth. He examined
into her condition. She told him that her baby was under the bed,
and he found it there. She showed symptoms of having absorbed
some poison, and he had her conveyed to the hospital for
treatment. The foetus was seven or eight inches long and without
life in it. She was apparently a stout, robust woman, and he saw
nothing to indicate the necessity of an operation to produce a
miscarriage in order to save her life.102
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Claudia Parrish was only sixteen years old when she became pregnant
by Paul Meagher in 1906.103 She was initially uncertain about the cause of
her missed menstrual periods; her doctor attributed them to a cold and
gave her a “some simple remedy,”104 her sister May suggested Hunyadi
Water.105 When Claudia’s condition became more obvious, May wrote to
Meagher, telling him that “it is up to you to do something.”106 May would
later testify that by “do something,” she meant either that Meagher would
marry Claudia, or come forward and admit the pregnancy to their father –
she “did not expect anything more.”107
Nevertheless, May accompanied Claudia to meet Meagher at Seventh
Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., from whence they rode the
streetcar to G street, S.W.108
Claudia was crying on the way. Meagher told them they should
tell "Mrs. Pierce" that Claudia was married, and that "Mrs. Rock"
had sent them to her. He showed them the house of "Mrs. Pierce,"
which was No. 41 G street, S.W. He said he would not go past the
house with them, because she would think detectives were
watching her. Just before getting to the house he got behind a
woodpile at the corner, and stood there. He gave Claudia $10.
"Mrs. Maxey" answered the knock at the door, and said she
supposed she was the person looked for. She asked if the visit was
about "abortion business." She told them to sit down, as she had a
patient in the back room. Returning she asked them if they knew
"Mrs. Rock," and they said yes. She said she did not see why
Claudia should not get over it, and said she had had many patients.
Finally she took Claudia up stairs. She came down in about twenty
minutes, with a towel in her hands that showed blood upon it.
Holding it up she said it was unusual to get so much blood the first
time. She gave Claudia some medicine, and told her to return the
day after tomorrow. She said there was a possibility that Claudia
103
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might have to go to bed, and that she knew a "colored lady" who
would take her in if she got sick; would find out and let her know
[when Claudia returned] . . . . [Claudia and May] left and met
Meagher on the corner, and told him what had occurred. He asked
if she inquired if they knew "Mrs. Rock," and they said yes, and
that they told the woman they knew "Mrs. Rock" very well, and
also that Claudia was married. He asked if the money was
sufficient, and if Claudia was coming again. He was told that the
money was sufficient, and that Claudia was to return on
Wednesday. He rode part of the way home with them, furnishing
the car tickets.109

The night of the abortion (a Monday), Claudia had “two chills.”110 By
Tuesday night she was very sick, and on the Wednesday she could barely
walk. On Thursday morning, she dragged herself to the Riggs Hotel,
where May worked as a telephone operator. May sent her immediately by
hansom cab to Columbia Hospital. There, the following morning, “Mrs.
Pierce’s” treatment had its intended effect – despite the surgical resident’s
efforts to prevent miscarriage, a four-month fetus was delivered lifeless at
11 A.M.111 But Mrs. Pierce’s catheter had brought with it something else:
“puerperal septicemia.”112 That night, Claudia became delirious. Over the
next three days, Claudia’s temperature reached 105 degrees, and her pulse
rose at times to 160 b.p.m. By the end, an inflammatory mass larger than
the surgeon’s fist protruded from her uterus. Despite attempts at antiseptic
cleansing of the uterus, Claudia died on the morning of June 27, 1906.113
On the advice of a “contact,” Mr. and Mrs. Carl Meinardus traveled
from Brooklyn, New York to Washington D.C. in December of 1968.114
As instructed, they checked into the Skyline Inn at South Capitol and I
Streets, S.W., and telephoned “Mary” at 554-4849. “Mary” picked up
Mrs. Meinardus in a taxi the following afternoon, and took her to 1425
Fourth Street, S.W., apartment A-505. They were greeted by a man who
identified himself as “Dr. Ewing” (actually Thomas Phillip Martini, who
109
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had been convicted of criminal abortion in 1957 and arrested again on that
charge in 1966).115
“Dr. Ewing” gave Mrs. Meinardus several pills and injections, then
took her into a bedroom that had been outfitted with a gynecologist’s
examination table. Mrs. Meinardus placed her legs in the stirrups, and the
“doctor” went to work. “Mary” returned Mrs. Meinardus to the Skyline
Inn that evening; she had been gone approximately six and one half hours.
Although it was late, the Meinarduses drove the 230 miles back to
Brooklyn that night. The next morning, Mrs. Meniardus suffered severe
cramps and was admitted to Community Hospital in Brooklyn, listed in
critical condition due to a septic abortion. While sixty years of medical
progress since Claudia Parrish’s death saved Mrs. Meinardus’s life, it
could not save her fertility. Antibiotics controlled the infection, but she
underwent a hysterectomy to remove her destroyed womb.116
Six decades separate the abortions of Claudia Parrish and Mrs.
Meinardus, but the experience of criminal abortion did not change terribly
much over that period. A universe of clandestine contacts, pseudonyms,
anonymous buildings, and the potential for medical complications still
awaited any woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy outside the limited
purview of medically sanctioned abortion.
B. Legal Disability And Ordeal In The Courts
It is true that District of Columbia courts posed no direct threat to
abortion patients as potential defendants. No reported District of
Columbia case involves the prosecution of a patient. By 1908, courts
explicitly interpreted the language of § 809 (later § 22-201) as applying
only to the abortion provider.117 But while a patient was formally viewed
as a “victim, rather than an accomplice,”118 her standing in court was often
significantly tainted by virtue of her abortion.
In at least one case, evidence that a witness had undergone the
abortion about which she testified was deemed a proper “bad act” for
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impeachment of her credibility.119 The trial judge in Thomspson
instructed the jury that “according to the testimony of Sadie Volk, while
she is not an accomplice, strictly speaking, inasmuch as, from her own
evidence, she morally implicates herself in the act, the jury should
consider that circumstance as bearing on her credibility.”120
Because patients often provided the strongest evidence against their
clients, defense attorneys in abortion cases had strong incentives to target
them for character assassination. In the trial of Dr. Henry Peckham, Jr.,
defense counsel Dorsey Offutt attempted to introduce evidence that Mary
Ott, the complaining witness, had received psychiatric treatment at
Bethesda Naval Hospital, and had undergone a string of earlier, unrelated
abortions.121 According to the trial judge’s subsequent finding of
contempt, Offut also subpoenaed Ott’s mother for no relevant purpose,
thus forcing her to travel from Erie, Pennsylvania and listen to her
daughter describe her abortion in open court.122 He also asked Ott “When
were you arrested in this case,” clearly a disingenuous question intended
to prejudice the jury, since arrest and prosecution of a patient were almost
unknown in the District of Columbia.123
This sort of attempt to “besmirch a witness”124 appears again in In re
Quantz, where the petitioner’s trial counsel sought to introduce evidence
of the extramarital affair that had resulted in the complaining witness’s
pregnancy.125 Counsel also attempted to question the witness about
119
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previous miscarriages and abortions, about whether she had been
completely naked when the abortion was performed, and about “an alleged
fight between [the witness] and a Chinese woman.”126
A patient injured by a negligently performed abortion was also
disadvantaged in the eyes of the court. Abortion’s illegality necessarily
precluded recovery under a breach of contract theory, since contracts
concerning illegal acts are generally unenforceable. But the moral taint of
the plaintiff’s abortion also denied recovery under a tort theory in the D.C.
case of Hunter v. Wheate.127 The court refused to sustain an action arising
“ex turpi causa,” finding it “hardly necessary to say that in voluntarily
participating in the miscarriage upon herself, the appellee engaged, not
only in an unlawful act, but also in one which was immoral . . . .”128
C. Race
It is somewhat surprising that, given the District of Columbia’s history
of segregation and racial discord, race does not play a significant role in
the District’s reported abortion cases. Most cases do not comment on the
race of either provider or patient. A notable exception, however, is Harrod
v. United States, which expresses the moral danger blacks posed to whites
in the public imagination of 1928. The defendant Amanda Harrod was an
“elderly colored woman,” convicted of performing, for a fee of $30, three
surgical treatments on Edna K. Steinbrucker, resulting in a miscarriage.129
The police apparently interviewed Steinbrucker and her paramour Jolliffe
after “they had observed numerous young white couples going into
[Harrod’s] house and leaving after brief visits.”130 Upon entering the
house, the police discovered “several white people in the house [who]
declared they were there for similar treatments.”131
This fear that blacks were contributing to white corruption by
performing or aiding abortions is alluded to in Maxey; the court apparently
found it significant that Kate Maxey promised to send Claudia Parrish to a
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“colored lady” for nursing if the abortion made her sick.132 But race
remains otherwise absent from the judicial discussion of abortion in the
District of Columbia, albeit with the curious exception of Dr. Quantz’s
charge that his patient had engaged in a fight with a “Chinese woman.”133
D. Governmental Targeting
While the local police seem to have enforced D.C.’s abortion laws
passively, waiting for hospitals to report providers careless or unfortunate
enough to maim or kill their patients, on at least one occasion the United
States Post Office Department employed a “sting operation” to enforce its
own federal statute.134
On November 14, 1912, Postal Inspector James Woltz sent the
following letter from Concord, North Carolina, to Dr. Thomas J. Kemp, in
his home office at 433 G. Street, N.W.:
My Dear Doctor: –
I trust you will pardon my writing you as I am, but I am in such
great distress and so anxious to find some way out of it, that this is
my only excuse. I am a young man, married, and have been
unfortunate enough to have gotten a young woman friend into
trouble, to be plain, she is in a family way. Of course, I cannot
marry her, and the condition she is in makes it necessary that she
be afforded relief at as early a period as possible. She cannot
permit the matter to go to full period either, as that would mean the
ruin of her reputation, a thing not to be thought of. The girl is only
twenty-two years old and is about two and a half months gone. If
you can and will take this matter for us and relieve the girl of her
trouble, will you please let me know what it will cost and about
how long she would have to stay up there in Washington? Will it
be necessary for her to go to a Hospital or could the business be
done here by the use of medicines? I want to be frank and tell you
that we have tried two or three things we saw advertised and got at
the drug store here, but they have been without effect.
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Sincerely,
Quincy Compton.135
Dr. Kemp responded to the (fictitious) Mr. Compton general delivery
at the Concord, North Carolina post office as follows: “Dear Sir: Your
letter received and would say it would cost about two hundred & would
have to stay here one week – destroy this letter – Can’t write about this
better come – This is answer to your letter won't sign my name.”136 Some
days later, a Detective Honvery arrived at 433 G. Street, and introduced
himself to Kemp as “Quincy Compton.”137 Kemp told Honvery that he
would not perform the operation in his office, but rather in a room at the
Metropolitan hotel, which he proceeded to reserve for the supposed
patient.138
Dr. Kemp was subsequently convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, 36
Stat. 1129 (1911), which proscribed sending any advertisement or
information about abortion services through the mail. On appeal, he
argued that his letter facially contained no abortion information, that the
offense was impossible since both the letter’s purported author and the
patient were fictitious persons, and that he had been entrapped by the
postal inspectors.139 The Court of Appeals ruled that the letter’s meaning
could be taken in the context of the document to which it replied and Dr.
Kemp’s subsequent statements and actions.140 It further held that that the
non-existence of author or patient were immaterial, since the offense
under § 1461 was complete upon mailing of the letter.141 And it rejected
Kemp’s entrapment defense on the grounds that
[the letter] was not such an inducement to commit crime as the law
condemns. It left the way open to defendant . . . either to act the
part of an honest man or the part of a criminal. Without any
influence from anyone he chose the latter course. . . . “[T]he
allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea
135
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as ancient as the world . . . 'The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.'
That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver . . . has never
since availed to shield crime . . . and it is safe to say that under any
code of civilized, not to say Christian ethics, it never will.”142

Kemp was sentenced to two years in federal prison, but his sentence
was commuted to a fine of $500 by President Woodrow Wilson.143 The
four-line letter did not ultimately cost Dr. Kemp his freedom, but it did
cost him his medical license: the Board of Medical Supervisors revoked it
on May 29, 1916.144 This administrative decision was reviewable by the
Court of Appeals, wherein Kemp argued that his crime – the mailing of a
letter – was not one of moral turpitude and thus could not be the basis for
discipline on that ground.145 The court upheld the revocation, finding that
“[a]bortion is held to involve moral turpitude. . . . Analyzing [appellant’s]
motive . . . but one conclusion can be reached; namely, a willful and
intentional disposition on his part, for a small pecuniary consideration, to
prostitute his high profession.”146
E. Bribery Of Witnesses
As a class of defendants, physicians are likely to have greater financial
resources than most individuals.
The collateral consequences of
conviction also tend to be greater than for other defendant classes, because
physicians’ livelihoods are dependant on both reputation and government
licensing.
It is not surprising, then, that physicians often spent
considerable sums litigating their defenses. But on occasion, the
combination of a strong motivation to escape conviction and the financial
resources to serve that goal led District physicians to influence justice by
illicit means.
Dr. Henry M. Ladrey was indicted under § 22-201 in October of 1943
for performing an abortion on Hazel Queen.147 Three months later, Queen
informed Metropolitan Police detectives that the doctor’s wife Eva had
scheduled a meeting at Queen’s home for the evening of January 7th.
142
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That night, police Sergeants Scott and Crooke listened from a back room
while Mrs. Ladrey offered Queen $260 to “drop the case.”148 Mrs. Ladrey
produced an envelope containing $100, and promised the rest ($100 to
complete the bribe and $60 as a refund of the abortion fee) once the
charges were dropped.
Mrs. Ladrey was immediately arrested, and, according to Scott and
Crooke’s testimony, did not deny her purpose in coming to Queen’s
home.149 Scott and Crooke told Mrs. Ladrey that they planned to search
the area for anyone who might have brought her to the house. According
to the policemen, Mrs. Ladrey then declared, “Well, I will tell you, I am
Mrs. Ladrey. Dr. Ladrey is waiting at 6th and Trumbell for me.”150 As
promised, Dr. Ladrey was discovered waiting by his car at that
intersection. When questioned, he admitted dropping Mrs. Ladrey off in
the vicinity, but denied knowing where she was going or what she
intended to do.151 Unsurprisingly, the jury
regarded as incredible the declaration of a man who lived in
Alexandria, Virginia, that he had let his wife out of the car in the
darkness of a winter evening at Georgia Avenue and Trumbell
street, some miles from their residence, but that he did not know
where she was going or what she was going to do.152
The Ladreys were convicted of attempted bribery under D.C. Code §
22-701, and their convictions were affirmed in May, 1946.153 The
outcome of Dr. Ladrey’s underlying abortion charge is uncertain, but his
brush with the law evidently did not deter him from performing abortions
upon completion of his sentence. In November 1954, a man by the name
of Matthews brought an anonymous patient to Ladrey’s N Street office.154
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Ladrey performed a surgical abortion, complications from which
subsequently proved fatal.155
After making a statement at police headquarters, Matthews agreed to
telephone Ladrey while a homicide detective listened on an extension.156
While Ladrey was not charged in the death, his incriminating statements
were sufficient evidence for the Medical Licensure Commission to revoke
Ladrey’s license on grounds of professional misconduct.157 Curiously,
loss of his license did not prevent Dr. Ladrey from becoming Imperial
Director of the Shrine Tuberculosis and Cancer Research Foundation the
following year, a post he held until 1982.158
The pattern of an accused physician attempting to bribe his patient
through a female intermediary was repeated in 1950 by Dr. William
Goodloe.159 Goodloe was under grand jury investigation for allegedly
attempting an abortion on Gloria Huffman.160 Dr. Goodloe’s offer was
more substantial than Dr. Ladrey’s: he intended to relocate Huffman to
California at his expense if she would depart before she was
subpoenaed.161 Goodloe employed a female acquaintance named Alice
Galusha to negotiate with Huffman, who was reluctant to accept. Galusha
rode with Goodloe to Huffman’s Baltimore home on several occasions,
where she was ultimately arrested by policemen who observed her from a
closet as she produced $600 and offered to purchase an airline ticket.162
Based largely on Huffman’s grand jury testimony, Dr. Goodloe was
indicted for abortion, conspiracy, and attempted bribery; he was convicted
on all counts and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.163
Dr. Allen Forte, previously convicted of abortion in Alabama in 1942,
moved his practice to Washington, D.C. at some point before 1961.164 In
that year, Forte was indicted for allegedly performing an abortion on Jean
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Smith of Baltimore.165 Despite Smith’s trial testimony, Forte was
acquitted, based on his defense that the abortion had never taken place but
rather had been fabricated as part of a shakedown by a rogue D.C. police
officer.166
Forte’s accusations led to a grand jury investigation of the policeman,
but the investigation soon revealed quite a different picture of events.
When the initial police investigation of the alleged abortion had ensued,
Forte and his attorney James Laughlin had apparently retained the services
of Baltimore police officer Bernice Gross.167 Not only did Gross attempt
to obstruct the investigation on Forte and Laughlin’s behalf, she also acted
as a go-between in their attempts to bribe Jean Smith.168 Smith, it turned
out, had accepted cash and baby clothes from Gross in return for writing a
letter to the United States Attorney asking to be excused as a witness.169
As a result of their bribery and the subsequent cover-up (chiefly
Laughlin’s denial to the grand jury that he had had any contact with Gross
despite wiretap evidence to the contrary),170 Laughlin and Forte embarked
on a legal odyssey of at least five separate proceedings involving a
mistrial, convictions for perjury, conspiracy, and witness tampering,
reversal of these convictions, and eventual reconviction.171 Interestingly,
while Laughlin retained counsel on his own behalf, he continued to
represent Forte himself throughout.172 Laughlin may not have been a
particularly sympathetic character in the Washington legal community. In
1949, he had defended Mildred Gillars, a.k.a. “Axis Sally,” the American
Nazi propagandist of Radio Berlin.173 He reportedly accused Jean Smith
of being a prostitute, and had apparently leveled that charge against a
165

Id. at 289.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
United States v. Laughlin, 344 F.2d 187, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1965)[hereinafter Laughlin
IV].
171
See Laughlin IV; United States v. Laughlin, 226 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C.
1964)[hereinafter Laughlin III](denying government motion to vacate dismissal);
United States v. Laughlin, 223 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. Nov. 1963)[hereinafter
Laughlin II](dismissing indictment); Laughlin I.
172
Laughlin I, 222 F. Supp. at 264; Laughlin II, 223 F. Supp. at 624; Laughlin IV, 344
F.2d at 187.
173
See Dale P. Harper, Axis Sally, WORLD WAR II, Nov. 1995, available at
http://womenshistory.about.com/library/prm/blaxissally2.htm.
166

36

DOUGLAS R. MILLER

female witness in a previous case.174 One witness commented that the
grand jury investigation should be held “on a little higher standards than
Jim Laughlin’s concept of trying a law case.”175
F. Defenses
Whatever their feelings about the social utility of their services,
abortion defendants stood accused of a serious criminal offense. When
hailed into court, it was rarely prudent to rely on the political philosophy
behind the provision of abortion. Rather, like all accused criminals,
abortion providers needed to advance some legal or factual theory that
would place their conduct outside the prohibitions of the statute.
“I didn’t do it” is of course the simplest defense to any crime. When
there is a dead body to be explained, this defense often results in the
classic “plan B” – casting suspicion on another culprit. When death
occurs from septic abortion, the most obvious “plan B” culprit is the
victim herself. Kate Maxey’s defense to the abortion death of Claudia
Parrish was accordingly straightforward: Claudia had induced the
miscarriage and resulting infection herself.176
The difficulty with this theory was that two witnesses put Claudia
(heretofore a stranger) in Mrs. Maxey’s house on the day of the abortion,
and police detectives later discovered a catheter in a bedroom.177 Maxey’s
counsel advanced what might grotesquely be termed the “pencil defense.”
He first persuaded the government’s medical witness to admit on crossexamination that the uterine injury could resulted from vaginal insertion of
a lead pencil.178 He next put Maxey’s daughter-in-law Mary Lackey on
the stand to relate a most extraordinary (if true) conversation between
defendant and deceased. Claudia came to the house, Lackey testified,
seeking employment.179 For reasons which are not clear, Claudia
informed her prospective employer that she was pregnant, that she was
“bound to get rid of it . . . [and was] going to do something very rash,”
and that she had used Hunyadi water, “some kind of pill,” and a lead
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pencil to induce miscarriage.180 The catheter, Lackey claimed, belonged
to her; Maxey often used it on Lackey to “draw water” (on medical
orders), but she had never known Maxey to perform an abortion.181 Not
surprisingly, the jury did not afford this defense very much weight – Kate
Maxey was convicted along with Claudia’s paramour Paul Meagher.182
For licensed physicians, who could legitimately perform gynecological
procedures, another defense was available: the operation took place, but it
was not an abortion. Dr. Alva Harper advanced this defense in 1956,
claiming that his patient had presented with a complaint of vaginal
bleeding.183 The procedure during which he “inserted some medicine into
her body through an instrument known as a speculum” was not an attempt
to abort the pregnancy, he claimed, but rather to preserve it.184
Unfortunately for Dr. Harper, the government called two rebuttal
witnesses, each of whom testified that Harper had previously performed
abortions on them.185 Although seemingly in violation of the “character
propensity ban” on prior-crimes evidence, this testimony was admitted as
evidence of Harper’s intent.186 Harper’s objection, motion for a new trial,
and appeal on this point were rejected; he was convicted and his
conviction affirmed.187
Dr. Harper also attempted to raise a second defense: that his patient
may not actually have been pregnant at all when the procedure was
performed.188 This defense would likely have failed on the facts, since the
evidence tended to show that she was pregnant.189 But curiously, this sort
of impossibility defense had been rejected as a matter of law the previous
year in Peckham II.190 In that case, the D.C. Circuit approved the district
court’s instruction to the jury that the patient’s actual pregnancy was
immaterial so long as the defendant believed he was inducing a
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miscarriage.191 Comparing the statutes of various states, it found that
many explicitly required pregnancy, many explicitly did not require
pregnancy, and others (including D.C. since the 1901 code) were silent on
the matter.192 The court held that this silence should be interpreted as
making pregnancy unnecessary, although the only support it could find for
this ruling was contained in two nineteenth-century English cases.193
Given the language of the D.C. statute, an obvious defense to abortion
is therapeutic necessity. If the life or health of the patient were threatened,
then abortion was permissible in the District of Columbia – a very liberal
standard compared to the majority of states which allowed only life-ofthe-mother exceptions.194 But it is not immediately obvious from the
statute whether the exception is intended as an affirmative defense or a
necessary element in the government’s prima facie case. This ambiguity
was settled in 1943 when raised by the defendants in Williams v. United
States.195 The court relied on a two-prong test, articulated by Justice
Cardozo in Morrison v. California,196 for determining whether a statutory
excuse requires proof by the defendant or disproof by the government.197
Under the Cardozo test, the burden of proving excuse properly belongs to
the defense where the act is “sinister” in character unless excused, or
where there exists “a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and
opportunity for knowledge.”198 The Williams court found, on the second
prong, that evidence of whether an abortion was medically necessary is
clearly more available to the person who performs it.199 On the first
prong, it determined that Cardozo’s “sinister act” requirement was met
because
“abortion is generally regarded as heinous in character . . . . The
performance of an abortion for [non-medical] purposes is so
offensive to our moral conception that it does not seem unjust to
put on the defendant who has committed an abortion the burden of
191
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producing evidence that the act was justified on therapeutic
grounds.”200
This requirement remained a part of D.C.’s abortion jurisprudence for
twenty-eight years, until the United States Supreme Court shifted it back
to the government in United States v. Vuitch.201 The Court (authorized in
that pre-home-rule time to interpret D.C. statutes de novo) found that
[w]hen Congress passed the District of Columbia abortion law in
1901 and amended it in 1953, it expressly authorized physicians to
perform such abortions as are necessary to preserve the mother's
“life or health.” Because abortions were authorized only in more
restrictive circumstances under previous D.C. law, the change must
represent a judgment by Congress that it is desirable that women
be able to obtain abortions needed for the preservation of their
lives or health. It would be highly anomalous for a legislature to
authorize abortions necessary for life or health and then to demand
that a doctor, upon pain of one to ten years' imprisonment, bear the
burden of proving that an abortion he performed fell within that
category. Placing such a burden of proof on a doctor would be
peculiarly inconsistent with society's notions of the responsibilities
of the medical profession. Generally, doctors are encouraged by
society's expectations, by the strictures of malpractice law and by
their own professional standards to give their patients such
treatment as is necessary to preserve their health. We are unable to
believe that Congress intended that a physician be required to
prove his innocence.
Perhaps the most unusual answer to a District of Columbia abortion
charge was the insanity defense raised by Catherine Hopkins in 1959.202
After a series of telephone calls, Hopkins traveled to the home of an
unnamed woman on March 3, 1956.203 Shortly afterward, Hopkins
summoned her sister, a Mrs. Simmons.204 On Simmons’ arrival, she met a
200
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woman who “wished to get rid of a child,” and wanted Simmons to babysit her young daughter while she and Hopkins remained upstairs.205
Simmons warned Hopkins “not to do anything that would get her into
trouble,” but agreed to watch the girl and answer the door if anyone came
to the house.206 What happened upstairs is unclear, but it apparently
involved fifty dollars207 and a catheter,208 and took place in “an outrageous
and brutal manner, the details of which are too repulsive for recital as a
part of [a judicial] opinion.”209 The end result, in any case, was that Mrs.
Simmons and her husband wound up rushing the woman to D.C. General
Hospital, where, after identifying Hopkins as her abortion provider, she
died.210
But Hopkins herself was admitted to D.C. General, where she would
spend two months before being transferred to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital (the
District’s mental health facility) with a diagnosis of schizophrenic
reaction, schizoaffective type.211 After nearly two years in St. Elizabeth’s,
Hopkins stood trial for second-degree murder (which had become the
available charge in fatal abortion cases under the 1953 amendment to §
22-201). At trial, the defense presented several psychiatrists, but also
Hopkins’ mother who testified that, ever since an ear operation at the age
of eight, Hopkins had “just acted plum different.”212 As a teenager, her
mother explained, Hopkins complained of hearing voices, tore out her
hair, and attempted to jump out of windows.213 Hopkins’ mother testified
that, on one occasion, her daughter had “called the undertaker and sent
him to a girl friend’s home on Eleventh Street. She sent flowers to the
girl, and told me the girl was dead. And I called and they said she wasn’t
dead.”214 The District Court, sitting without a jury, convicted Hopkins,
finding that she was not legally insane at the time of the abortion.215 But
the Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, finding that the trial judge could
not reasonably have found that the government had met its burden of
205
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proving Hopkins sane.216 It remanded the case for entry of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity, and of an order committing Hopkins to St.
Elizabeth’s.
The preceding defenses run the gamut from the obvious to the bizarre,
but all turn on either the statute’s application to the defendant’s conduct,
or on whether the conduct is otherwise excusable. None questions the
propriety of the law itself. For that type of challenge, Washington would
have to wait for a pugnacious Yugoslav backed by a cadre of civil
libertarians.
G. The Constitutional Attack of United States v. Vuitch
Milan Vuitch was not unused to conflict. Born in Serbia in 1915, he
had completed his medical training in Hungary only to be captured during
the Nazi invasion and conscripted into the Army Medical Corps of the
Third Reich.217 Eventually taken prisoner by the United States Army, he
might reasonably have grown wary of imprisonment, and led a quiet life in
Skopie or (after his immigration in 1955) Washington. Instead, he openly
flouted § 22-201, bringing his skill at abortion (common in Yugoslavia) to
bear first for the Eastern European immigrant community, and later the
community at large.218 He appears to have been motivated by compassion
rather than profit; he generally charged $100-$200 – a fraction of the
going rate – and believed that “women cry for help, and doctors just chase
them away. I saw people dying like flies in the war, and I couldn’t do
much. If I can help now, why shouldn’t I?”219 Indeed, Vuitch continued
to perform abortions even after two arrests and a trial which ended in a
hung jury.220
Vuitch’s passion for his work and belief in its social value made him
an ideal subject for the test case planned by a civil rights committee which
would later become the National Abortion Rights Action League
(NARAL). The District’s prohibition was targeted for a number of
216
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reasons. First, a trial in the nation’s capital would have strong symbolic
significance. Second, the federal courts’ unique supervision of D.C.’s
“state” law meant that an appellate court would have broad powers of
statutory interpretation. Third, § 22-201 was rare in that it permitted
abortion to save not only the life of the patient, but also her health.221 This
ambiguity would provide the primary basis for Dr. Vuitch’s challenge.
Vuitch undertook a course of action calculated to result in his arrest.
He instructed normally clandestine referral services to give his name and
phone number openly. He mixed abortion cases in with his general
surgery patients, instead of performing them early in the morning or late at
night as had been his practice. He abandoned the use of code words and
middlemen common to the illegal abortion community.222 These actions
inevitably forced the police to take action, but they also removed the
potential that secretive behavior could be used as evidence of a guilty state
of mind.223
On May 1, 1968, the Metropolitan Police Department Homicide Squad
raided Vuitch’s office. They had been tipped off by a patient’s husband,
who had impregnated his wife (along with another woman and a sixteenyear-old girl) during a temporary reconciliation.224 This informant,
Donald R., arrived at Dr. Vuitch’s office with his wife and $300 in marked
bills. Once Mrs. R was on the table, Donald signaled the police, who
seized the operating table and instruments, arrested Dr. Vuitch, and
transported Mrs. R. (whether or not voluntarily is unclear) to D.C. General
Hospital for examination.225
Mrs. R. had inadvertently proved the perfect “victim” for the test case,
because her situation fell at the margin of health risks that § 22-201 might
conceivably permit: a purely mental health justification premised on social
grounds. “This woman had described her mental suffering – her
husband’s frequent desertions and extramarital affairs, an unwanted
pregnancy by a husband she detested – it was all down on my chart. Only
I, as her doctor, could decide whether her health had been threatened,”
Vuitch asserted.226 For “the police [or] some district attorney”227 to make
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this judgment instead of the physician created a “vague requirement,
altogether lacking acceptable standards” and under which “there will
never be an instance in which a physician is able to defend his actions
successfully where the evidence shows an exercise of medical judgment . .
. .”228 Thus, Vuitch would argue, application of the law violated his own
due process rights.
But Vuitch’s challenge went beyond void-for-vagueness due process
and struck at the very notion of the state’s legitimacy in regulating
abortion. In what would become the familiar twin challenges to abortion
regulation in the United States, Vuitch argued that § 22-201 violated both
the fundamental rights and the equal protection guarantees implied in the
Fifth Amendment (the Fourteenth Amendment not applying to the District
of Columbia).229
His equal protection argument concerned the
disproportionate impact of § 22-201 on black women in the District; his
fundamental rights due process argument followed on the holdings of
Griswold v. Connecticut and Loving v. Virginia.230
Such was the public interest in the Vuitch case that Judge Arnold
Gesell read his memorandum opinion from the bench to a capacity
crowd.231 The exceptions portion of the statute was void for vagueness,
Gesell announced, because “[t]he jury's acceptance or nonacceptance of an
individual doctor's interpretation of the ambivalent and uncertain word
‘health’ should not determine whether he stands convicted of a felony,
facing ten years’ imprisonment.”232 Gesell went so far as to say that § 22201’s “many ambiguities are particularly subject to criticism, for the
statute unquestionably impinges to an appreciable extent on significant
constitutional rights of individuals.”233 But despite approving in principle
of the equal protection and fundamental rights arguments, he was
unwilling to strike down the statute as a whole. He suggested that
“Congress should re-examine the statute promptly in the light of current
conditions,” but ultimately concluded that “[t]he court cannot legislate.”234
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For a brief moment, Washington became the only American
jurisdiction in which legal abortion was available throughout pregnancy
on the judgment of a single physician. Vuitch’s practice boomed, and
patients frequently waited up to four weeks for an appointment.235 But
even at the height of his success, Vuitch continued to charge no more than
$300 per case, and often operated on indigent women free of charge.236
This brief interlude in the life of Dr. Vuitch and the women of
Washington, D.C. came to an end, however, when the Supreme Court
determined that “health” was not overly vague, and reversed the District
Court’s dismissal of the indictment.237
Yet, despite this defeat, the Vuitch test case had achieved much. In its
ruling, the Supreme Court found that § 22-201 could not be read to place
the burden of proving medical necessity on the defendant.238 It thereby
overturned the onerous rule of Williams. Furthermore, in finding “health”
not overly vague, the Court explicitly ruled that purely psychological
injuries were permissible grounds for abortion.239 Section 22-201 was
thus considerably weakened for the two years it survived before Roe. But
perhaps more importantly, the Vuitch test case inspired dozens like it in
jurisdictions throughout the country, shaping both the jurisprudence and
the popular will that would ultimately lead to the recognition of legal
abortion as a constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
At the time of its creation, the District of Columbia possessed no
written laws to govern its citizens’ practice of abortion. But the legal
tradition to which the District was heir encompassed a rich history of
reasoning on its legitimacy. The tortious miscarriage provisions of 21
Exodus 22-25 began the recorded legal history of fetal protection law in
Western civilization. Although ambiguous in the Hebrew original, by the
third century B.C., it is clear that the language of Exodus was interpreted
to signify a mid-gestational attachment of fetal protection. Following
Aristotelian notions of fetal development, the early and medieval Christian
church adopted this delineation as consistent with the Augustine notion of
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ensoulment. In England, the point of attached protection was defined
precisely at quickening, these first fetal movements taken as evidence of
the rational soul’s arrival. Thus the District inherited a Common Law
abortion rule arguably in tune with women’s subjective experiences of
their own bodies: the law of homicide protected the fetus only after its
manifestation at quickening as an independent being.
The nineteenth-century physicians’ anti-abortion campaign sought to
change this status quo by criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy.
The American Medical Association’s motivations for this movement were
to a large degree self-interested and independent of the moral justifications
it advanced. The campaign was arguably as much about restraining
competition from “irregulars” (especially midwives) as it was about
preserving fetal life. Employing imagery that ranged from miniature men
suspended in amniotic fluid to infant kangaroos suckling in a pouch, the
anti-abortion movement brought dubious physiological arguments to bear
against the practice of abortion. The movement also drew heavily on
contemporary social concerns, painting abortion as a byproduct of
misguided feminism, a threat to female morality and family order, and a
tool by which immigrants would displace native-born Protestants as the
dominant American class. In response to this campaign, the Legislative
Assembly of the District of Columbia passed a comprehensive conceptionto-birth abortion prohibition in 1872.
Life under this prohibition presented numerous dangers for the women
of Washington D.C. and the abortion providers who continued to serve
them despite the legal condemnation of their conduct. While women were
not prosecuted for having abortions, their reliance on under-trained
practitioners working at remote locations without medical backup often
proved injurious or fatal in an age before antibiotics or widespread
understanding of sterile techniques. Women who had undergone abortions
faced legal disabilities before the courts: their testimony was discounted,
they were subject to vicious cross-examination, and they were barred from
recovery for negligent injury sustained during their abortions.
Abortion providers were the most frequent defendants under the
District’s abortion prohibition. In addition to incarceration, they faced the
loss of their livelihoods through license revocation, and loss of the
reputation so essential to the maintenance of a medical practice. Generally
they escaped punishment if they did not maim or kill their patients, but
occasionally the government was more aggressive, targeting providers
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through postal “sting” operations. While physicians generally used their
money and influence to defend themselves through legal means, a few
succumbed to temptation and sought to bribe witnesses and police.
Abortion providers advanced a range of defenses to their alleged crimes.
Some put forth fanciful blame-the-victim theories, others claimed that the
operation in question had been something other than abortion, or abortion
but with therapeutic justification. At least one defendant claimed to have
been insane at the time she killed her client.
The District’s abortion prohibition ultimately yielded to a
constitutional challenge, and while it was reinstated by the Supreme Court,
it had been significantly weakened and would survive only two more years
until struck down by Roe v. Wade. The century of criminal abortion in the
nation’s capital came to an end a generation ago, but its lessons remain
valuable as the battle over abortion rights continues to be waged in the
city’s corridors of power. While judges and politicians may be tempted to
regard the abortion question as arising from contemporary social and
scientific considerations, its legal and philosophical bases stretch back into
classical antiquity. While abortion opponents speak publicly of protecting
fetal life, their intellectual predecessors acted out of quite different
motivations, and appealed to other agendas that could well remain below
the surface of the current rhetoric. While abortion rights proponents focus
their arguments solely on female privacy and autonomy, they ignore
centuries of fetal protection jurisprudence, which must be conscientiously
addressed if it is to be subordinated or dispensed with. Most importantly,
jurists and policy makers must understand that abortion has always been a
part of human experience, and remains so when it is prohibited.
Throughout the nation, as in its capital, women will seek abortions,
whether access to the procedure is guaranteed or prohibited under the law.

